Can We Avoid a Sick Fiscal Future? The Non-Sustainability of Health-Care Spending with an Aging Population by Emery, J.C. Herbert et al.
www.pol icyschool.ca
Volume 5•Issue 31• October 2012
CAN WE AVOID A SICK FISCAL
FUTURE? THE NON-SUSTAINABILITY
OF HEALTH-CARE SPENDING WITH
AN AGING POPULATION  
J.C. Herbert Emery, David Still and Tom Cottrell†
SUMMARY
Funding for Canadian public health care has long relied on a “pay-as-you-go” funding model: for
the most part, government pays for health costs each year from taxes collected in that fiscal
year with effectively nothing put aside for projected rising health-care costs in the future. But
the future of Canadian public health care is going to get more expensive as the relatively large
cohort of baby boomers reaches retirement age. As they exit the work force, and enter the ages
at which Canadians use the health-care system more, a smaller population of younger workers
is going to be left paying the growing health-care costs of older Canadians. If Canadians intend
to preserve a publicly funded medicare system that offers a similar level of service in the future
as it does today, under the pay-as-you-go model, eventually peak taxes for Canadians born after
1988 will end up twice as high as the peak taxes that the oldest baby boomers paid. The “pay-
as-you-go” model has become like a Ponzi scheme, where those who got in early enough make
out nicely, while those who arrive late stand to suffer a serious financial blow. 
This should concern both Canadians who value a comprehensive public health system as well
as Canadians who value competitive tax rates: There is no reason to be certain that future
taxpayers will blithely accept having their taxes substantially increased to finance health care
for another, older generation that did not pay for a significant portion of its own health care. If
the burden proves too high for the taxpaying public to accept, that could well jeopardize
Canada’s health-care system as we know it. If Canadians intend to preserve their iconic public
health system, and are unprepared to unjustly overburden future generations with the tax bill
left by their parents and grandparents, provincial governments must make strong and rapid
efforts to reform the health system. They must find more cost-efficient ways of managing
medicine, including new approaches to eldercare, chronic disease prevention and better health
promotion. If policymakers respond in time with a workable strategy and adequate effort, the
substantial financial health-care liability currently faced by future generations may not be
eliminated entirely, but it can still be reduced dramatically.  
† The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees.
I.   INTRODUCTION
The Canadian population is aging. The proportion of Canadians aged 65 and over is forecast to
increase from around 15 per cent today to 25 per cent by 2030. Health spending is much higher
for Canadians over age 65, so considerable debate has occurred as to whether population aging
will challenge the financial sustainability of Canada’s single-payer medicare systems for doctors
and hospital services. Remarkably, economists and health services researchers largely agree on
the apparent modest impact that population aging will have on the growth of aggregate health
spending. Most estimates suggest that per-capita health spending has risen, and will rise, at only
one per cent per year. As this is a lower growth rate than the projected growth for the economy
(GDP), it follows that population aging is a manageable cost driver for public payers that poses
little threat to the sustainability of single-payer Canadian medicare.1
What the literature on population aging and health-care costs has neglected to appreciate is that,
while the aggregate growth of health spending due to population aging is modest, how we
finance that expenditure turns a modest fiscal challenge into a much bigger political economy
issue.2 Public spending on health care in Canada is largely financed out of general tax revenues
collected by the provinces and the federal government. This “pay-as-you-go” structure, where
current revenues fund current spending, is not a problem where populations are either stable or
continuously growing through natural population increases. When fertility rates fall, however,
pay-as-you-go financing for health care results in an unsustainable health-care system for the
public payer because we know that we will not be collecting sufficient revenues on an annual
basis to meet the required health-care costs of an older Canadian population if we maintain
current tax structures and taxation levels. Even with only one per cent annual increases in per-
capita health spending, Bill Robson3 estimates that the present value of the “implicit liability” of
promised public health-care spending under the pay-as-you-go funding model by 2040 (the
value of the unfunded portion of future health-care costs) is between $531 billion, calculated at
present value for 2001, and $1.4 trillion, net present value, in 2007.4 That is, governments would
need to have invested as much as $1.4 trillion, in 2007, to afford the health-care costs over and
above the services general revenues will cover, up to 2040. To maintain budget balances,
therefore, we must see tax levels eventually rise, health spending fall, or some combination of
those two things.5 In other words, the status quo of health spending promised to Canadians at
the current tax price of that spending is not sustainable with an aging population.
1 Robert G. Evans et al, “Apocalypse No: Population Aging and the Future of Health Care Systems.” Canadian Journal
on Aging, 20 (suppl. 1): 160-191 (2001) and Seamus Hogan and Sarah Hogan, “How an Aging Population Will Affect
Health Care,” Chapter 2 in Gregory P. Marchildon, Tom McIntosh, and Pierre-Gerlier Forest eds. The Fiscal
Sustainability of Health Care in Canada: Romanow Papers, Volume 1 (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2004).
This normative assessment of the impact of population aging may be optimistic since it ignores the possibility that
population aging itself will result in decreasing labour force and lower output per worker.  To offset the negative
economic consequences of population aging for economic growth and health care spending Canada will need to have
productivity gains.
2 William B.P. Robson, “Will the Baby Boomers Bust the Health Budget? – Demographic Change and Health Care
Financing Reform, ” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary. Toronto. No. 148 (2001) and “Time and Money – The
Challenge of Demographic Change and Government Finances in Canada, ” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder.
Toronto. No. 109 (2007).
3 Robson, “Will the Baby Boomers Bust the Health Budget?” and “Time and Money.”
4 Following Robson (2007), implicit liabilities are to be distinguished from unfunded liabilities. A reviewer notes that all
pay-as-you-go finance arrangements have an unfunded liability by definition.  Here we refer to “implicit liabilities” as
the insufficiency of revenues to be collected over time, at the existing level of taxation, to meet promised expenditures.
We contrast this with a situation where the promised future spending can be met by current levels of taxes levied.
5 It should be obvious that borrowing, which would convert the unfunded liability to explicit debt, does not address the
issue. Borrowing raises taxes of Canadians in the future to maintain spending levels in the near term.
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Beyond the large implicit health-care liability identified by Robson, the distribution of the
burden under the pay-as-you-go financing model is much higher for Canadians born after the
baby-boom generation. The main issue is the difference in timing between when a person uses
health-care services and when he or she pays the taxes that fund those services. The use of
health-care services occurs primarily at the beginning of life and toward the end of it, but the
majority of lifetime taxes are paid between the ages of 16 and 65. An annually balanced budget
would not normally account for the future liabilities of a disproportionately large aging cohort.
As that disproportionately large cohort ages, placing an increasingly large burden on the
health-care system, they will have already paid the bulk of their lifetime’s taxes — and
governments will have already spent those revenues — requiring either later, younger cohorts
to pay more in tax than previous cohorts did to maintain a similar health-care system, or
significant reductions will have to occur in the future level of health-care services. Because
financing Canadian medicare on a pay-as-you-go basis is increasingly expensive for successive
birth cohorts of Canadians, even a modest increase in per-capita health-care spending (one per
cent per year) creates the potential for a politically unsustainable health system. In short,
Canadian taxpayers in the future may be less supportive of medicare since it will be much
more expensive for them.6
In this paper, we illustrate the fiscal consequences of a sustainable single payer public health-
care system financed on a pay-as-you-go basis as the Canadian population ages. Our model
promises every Canadian at birth the same health-care spending profile by age. Based on this
guaranteed lifetime health-care spending, and knowing the age distribution of the population,
we can calculate total public health spending in a given year. We assume that the government
will collect sufficient taxes to pay for total health spending in a given year, where annual taxes
collected are proportional to individual income, which changes as individuals age.7 Under these
assumptions we allow the population age distribution to evolve over time. Then we calculate
the lifetime health spending received and the total lifetime taxes paid for an average person
born in a given year between 1948 and 2058. Comparing the net present values of lifetime
taxes and lifetime transfers/spending for health care at the year of birth provides a measure of
the “birth taxes” or “birth gifts” granted to Canadians born in a given year based on the status
quo of Canadian medicare.8
6 Emery (2010) shows that in a median voter model, population aging should result in lower public health spending
reflecting the higher “tax price” of health care when there is a larger proportion of the population that is lower
income and less healthy.
7 Our choice to model health care as completely financed by taxes on individuals, and not shared with taxes on capital
(corporate taxes), could be challenged by readers who see the solution to health-care sustainability as higher taxes on
corporations.  We accept that some readers may hold this view, but we note that the work by Davies and Winer
(2011) suggests that the long-run forces impacting labour mobility between Canada and the U.S. must be part of the
reason that we have seen a shift from taxing mobile capital and toward taxing relatively immobile labour.  Emery
(2011) and Kneebone (2012) raise the issue that if voters see health-care funding from capital taxes as a “subsidy,”
then voters may choose to increase health spending rather than keep it constant as we have assumed. Finally,
modeling the consequences of moving towards a greater reliance on corporate tax bases for financing health care is
complicated by the potential reductions in productivity growth that could accompany such taxation.
8 While our work is inspired by Laurence Kotlikoff’s (1992) “Generational Accounting” approach to public finance,
our calculations are different from generational accounts.  Generational accounts consider the taxes and transfers for
persons with a given birth year from the current date of a proposed policy change (and that person’s age at that date)
while we are considering taxes and transfers expected at birth.  Our reason for doing this is that we wanted to
consider the historical payment of taxes by older Canadians when making comparisons of the value of the health-
care asset provided by medicare across birth cohorts.  If we followed a true generational accounting perspective then
we would always find older Canadians to be large net beneficiaries, even though they had previously paid taxes into
the system under the expectation that the health-care services they used when older would be funded by taxes
collected from later generations.
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3We show that the burden of addressing Robson’s9 estimated Canadian medicare implicit
liabilities falls largely on Canadians born after 1990. This cohort will pay more through the tax
system than they will receive in health spending; Canadians born prior to 1990 will not have
paid the full resource cost of their health spending. Had we acted a decade ago on the advice of
Robson10 and Hogan and Hogan11, we could have moved health-care financing away from pay-
as-you-go to a “pre-funded” finance model, as was introduced for the Canada Pension Plan in
1997 to address the rise in spending associated with an aging Canadian population by ensuring
that future pension costs were fairly borne by those who would later produce those costs.
Similarly, taxes currently collected to pay for health care could have been set both to cover
current health needs as well as expected future increases in health-care costs of the baby-boom
generation. We believe it is too late to introduce pre-funding to address the situation because
baby boomers are already reaching the age of retirement and are past their years of highest
taxable earning. Furthermore, unlike the pre-funding of future pension benefits for the baby
boomers, where pension benefits can be set by the public payer, public payers for health care
have apparently much less control over spending levels and growth of spending. Higher taxes
levied to pre-fund health spending expected to rise solely due to population aging would
appear to have limited impact on reducing overall future tax burdens resulting from other
drivers of health-care spending, such as technological and technical advances. 
We discuss how the remaining option for sustaining pay-as-you-go, single payer medicare is to
“bend the cost curve” by reducing the costs/prices of services for treating the health-care needs
of Canadians over age 65. We show that health service delivery reforms, such as shifting care
settings from acute-care hospitals to the home, promoting multi-disciplinary team-based care,
and promoting better management of chronic diseases, if not reducing the prevalence of them,
have the potential to fully address the implicit liabilities associated with population aging under
the status quo of medicare. Pre-funding would be solely done to address intergenerational
equity considerations, but intergenerational equity is just one of several reasons that
governments need to push harder for health-care reform in Canada, to eliminate needlessly
high health-care spending for elderly and chronically ill Canadians.
II. A MODEL OF A SUSTAINABLE SINGLE-PAYER PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM
To examine the impact of population aging on public health-care spending, we consider a
particular form of a sustainable single payer public health-care system that we believe is a
reasonable representation of health-care funding in Canada. First, we assume that all Canadians
at birth are promised the same average spending, by age, over their lifetime. In other words, all
Canadians are endowed with the same lifetime health-care spending at birth. Second, knowing
the age distribution of the population in a given year, we can calculate total health-care
spending for the population. Third, we assume that Canadians will pay the taxes required 
9 Robson, “Will the Baby Boomers Bust the Health Budget?” and “Time and Money.”
10 Robson, “Will the Baby Boomers Bust the Health Budget?”
11 Seamus Hogan and Sarah Hogan, “How an Aging Population Will Affect Health Care,” Chapter 2 in Gregory P.
Marchildon, Tom McIntosh, and Pierre-Gerlier Forest eds. The Fiscal Sustainability of Health Care in Canada:
Romanow Papers, Volume 1 (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2004).
to cover health-care spending in a given year. Fourth, we apportion the tax payments across the
age distribution according to a relative age/tax profile that reflects the “hump shape” in the
age/earnings profile for Canadians, reflecting the rise and fall of earning power over a lifetime.
Fifth, we model the age distribution of the population according to assumptions that mortality
rates continue to fall, and under a range of assumed fertility and immigration scenarios. Finally,
we calculate the net present value of the difference between lifetime health spending and
lifetime tax payments for health care for Canadians born in every year from 1948 to 2058.
a) Health Spending by Age
In our hypothetical sustainable health-care system, we promise all Canadians the relative
profile of health spending by age based on Health Canada’s (2001) average public spending by
provincial and territorial governments on health care by age and sex, and the 2008 level of per-
capita health spending. In describing the age/health expenditure profile for Canada in 2009, the
Canadian Institute for Health Information, CIHI,12 shows that there is high spending per person
in the first year of life — $8,527 per person — but from age one to age 49, health expenditures
per person gradually rise from less than $1,000 to around $2,400. After age 50, there is a much
more rapid rise in health expenditures per person, reaching $25,000 at ages 80 and over. CIHI
reports that, while seniors accounted for only 14 per cent of the total population, they
accounted for 44 per cent of total health-care expenditures.
Figure 1 shows our assumed relative age/health care spending profile, combined for males and
females and normalized by (or, relative to) average health-care spending across all ages in
2001. As we have assumed Canadians born in 2008 and after will receive the average public
spending on health care for each age from 2008 onwards, we have also assumed away all other
drivers of cost increase unrelated to the aging population.13 Consequently, our calculated total
health-care spending for 2008 and after will only increase because of population aging (the
population aging mass moving to higher ages). In other words, we are showing the impact of
population after assuming that governments have successfully contained all other sources of
health-care cost increases. We also consider the fiscal implications of pay-as-you-go funding
when the population is aging and per-capita health-care costs are rising at 2.5 per cent per year
due to technical and technological advances in health care.
For years prior to 2008, we make a key adjustment to the promised age/health spending profile.
As health spending has increased due to technical and technological progress in health care, it
would be inappropriate to assume that a Canadian born in 1960 had the same health-care
spending from the public payer at a given age as a Canadian born in a later year at that same
age. Consequently, we scale the age/health spending profile by the ratio of constant dollar per-
capita health spending in a given year to the constant dollar per-capita health spending in 2008.
Thus, prior to 2008, the normalized profile of health spending by age is fixed, but the dollar
levels of spending do change. 
12 Canadian Institute for Health Information. 2011.  National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2011. (November
2011), Figure 32, page 49.
13 See Kneebone (2012) for a discussion of the importance of these other sources of increase in health spending.
Technical change leads to higher health-care expenditures because it makes new treatments feasible. Often these new
treatments are costly to do and/or increase the volumes of procedures performed, but do not reduce the cost per
service. It has proven politically challenging to restrain the demands of patients and providers to continually expand
treatment options.
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We calculate total public health-care spending in a given year by multiplying health-care costs
by age and sex for that year by the number of Canadians of a given sex and age, while
accounting for the age-specific mortality rate. We then sum across the sexes and across ages
zero to 100. Expected lifetime health-care spending on an individual born in a given year is the
sum of all his or her age-specific health spending in every calendar year from age zero to 100.
For the proportion of the population that survives to 100, we arbitrarily terminate all remaining
lives at that age.
FIGURE 1:  RELATIVE HEALTH-CARE COSTS AND HEALTH-CARE TAXES BY AGE
b) Tax Payments by Age
Jackson and Matier14 point out that, because age/income and age/consumption patterns tend to
be “hump-shaped,” with a person’s income and consumption peaking between the ages of 45
and 55, lifetime patterns of income and consumption, as well as income taxes and consumption
taxes paid, will follow roughly the same age profile. We assume that the relative incidence of
taxes collected over the age distribution in a given year is stable. For convenience we use
Oreopoulos and Vaillancourt’s Age Profile of Taxes15 for 1995 to generate the distribution for
taxes across ages zero to 100 shown in Figure 1.16 In each year, we assume that taxes are
collected to meet total health-care spending. Tax collections are apportioned across the
population according to the numbers of Canadians at each age and based on the age/tax profile
depicted in Figure 1.
14 Harriet Jackson and Chris Matier. “Public Finance Implications of Population Ageing: An Update.”  Department of
Finance Working Paper 2003-03. (2003), 9.
15 Philip Oreopoulos and François Vaillancourt, “Taxes,  Transfers,  and Generations in Canada: Who Gains and Who
Loses from the Demographic Transition, ” C.D. Howe Institute. Toronto. (1998), Figure 2, page 5.
16 Our reliance on the 1995 age/tax profile is a limitation for our analysis as there have been major tax changes in
Canada that may have altered the relative incidence of taxes collected by age.  For example, personal income tax was
re-indexed and a fourth tax bracket was introduced at the federal level in 2001; provinces have adopted their own
PIT rates and brackets under new tax-sharing agreements with the federal government; GST rates have changed from
seven per cent to five per cent; income splitting has been introduced for those over age 65; corporate income tax
rates have been greatly reduced; and so on. Despite these changes since 1995, Jackson and Matier (2003, Figure 2D)
show a relative age/tax incidence profile similar to the 1995 profile, suggesting that the myriad of tax changes may
have had less influence on the average taxes paid by age than they may have had on marginal tax rates of particular
groups of taxpayers.
5
0     5     10    15    20    25   30    35    40   45    50   55    60    65   70   75    80    85   90    95   100
Age
HC Costs
Taxes for
Health-Care
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
No
rm
al
ize
d 
Pe
r C
en
t
c) The Age Distribution of the Population over Time
Having described the static, or per-year, calculations of health-care spending and taxes
collected, we now turn to a description of the changing age distribution over time.17 Since men
and women have different life expectancies, and only women give birth to children, we needed
to separate the age distributions for the sexes. Since it was only possible to obtain demographic
data back to 1971, a frequency matrix of year and age was constructed for both men and
women starting in 1971 and ending in 2008.
To project the population beyond 2008, we assume that age- and sex-specific mortality rates
decline from what we observe for 2008. Mortality rates for 2008 are linearly decreased until
they reach the level of a 30-year-old, at minimum, for the ages over 50 — that is, where a 50
year old of the future is subject to the same mortality rate as a 30-year-old in 2008 — until the
implied life expectancy equals that of the Statistics Canada’s long-term projection.18
Although it would have been simplest to assume a constant birthrate, this would not be an
accurate assumption due to rate distortions in the age demographic (i.e. baby boomers, and the
baby boom echo). Consequently, we look at fertility rates by age for women, and we project
the future birthrate using the male and female age distributions; assuming that fertility changes
very slowly over time, one can ignore changes within its distribution. We also accounted for
the probabilities that a birth produces a male or female, since it is not a perfectly equal
probability. 
Immigration is another influence on the age distribution, so we consider several scenarios
where immigration rates continue after 2008 at the rates observed over the past 10, 20 and 30
years. We present the calculations using the average rate of immigration observed for Canada
over the past 30 years.
Using observed age distributions of the Canadian population for 1971 to 2008, and projected
age distributions for 1948 to 1971(where demographic data is not available) and for 2009 to
2158, we produce a matrix that describes the population sizes of birth cohorts, starting with
1948 and ending with Canadians born in 2158, to encompass the full effects of the baby-boom
generation on the Canadian population and health-care spending. Since we are interested in the
baby boomers, we must go back as far as 1948, and as far forward as 2158, since to encompass
the generation born in 2058 we must go at least 100 years beyond 2058, the last year (in our
model) for all members of that generation. That leaves us with a model spanning 210 years of
demographic calculations. While our calculations include other generations at the beginning
and end, we do not calculate their lifetime health spending and tax payments. 
17 Statistics Canada does produce population age projections.  We chose to do our own population modeling so that we
would be able to model health-care taxes and health-care spending under a variety of assumptions about population
growth.  In addition, as 1971 was the earliest year of data that we could obtain, we needed to do our own population
modeling to extend back to 1948.
18 Life expectancy 82.3 - 85.4 years for men, 86 - 88.4 years for women.
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III.   GENERATIONAL BALANCES FOR HEALTH-CARE SPENDING UNDER 
PAY-AS-YOU-GO FINANCE
Given our assumptions about health-care spending by age and sex, and the relative size of tax
payments by age, we can describe tax payments and health-care spending by age (in 2008
purchasing power) for Canadians born in given years for eleven 10-year birth cohorts. We start
with the oldest generation born in 1948, which would be 60 years of age in 2008, and end with
the youngest generation that would be born in 2058. The results we present, unless stated
otherwise, are based on the assumptions that age-specific fertility rates are constant from 2008
and that the average annual rate of immigration over 30 years prior to 2008 continues
indefinitely.  
Column 3 in Table 1 shows the expected net present value at birth of health-care spending
promised to men and women from birth to age 100, grouped into 10-year birth cohorts. The
differences in the value of lifetime health-care spending across birth cohorts reflects the
increasing life expectancy of Canadians over time as well as associated changes in the sex
composition of the cohorts at each year of age (as women, on average, outlive men). For
Canadians born in 2008 or after, we “endow” each Canadian with a health-care asset worth
around $35,000. The value of lifetime health-care spending is lower for Canadians born prior
to 2008 since we have accounted for the fact that average health-care spending levels were
lower prior to 2008. 
TABLE 1: NET PRESENT VALUE OF EXPECTED LIFETIME TAXES FOR HEALTH CARE AND HEALTH-CARE SPENDING FOR 
10 YEAR BIRTH COHORTS AT BIRTH, MALES AND FEMALES COMBINED (FIVE PER CENT DISCOUNT RATE)
Column 4 of Table 1 shows, for each 10-year birth cohort, the net present value at birth of
taxes collected for health care over an individual’s lifetime. One interpretation of these “birth
taxes” is that they are the price that each birth cohort pays for the public health-care asset that
they are endowed with at birth. Clearly, the health-care asset is getting more expensive for each
successive birth cohort because of pay-as-you-go financing. Column 5 of Table 1 presents the
difference in the net present values at birth between lifetime health spending and health-care
tax payments for each birth cohort, with males and females combined.
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1948 1957 21,123 20,188 935
1958 1967 26,302 22,155 4,147
1968 1977 29,527 25,467 4,060
1978 1987 30,699 29,141 1,558
1988 1997 32,576 32,344 232
1998 2007 34,693 35,202 -510
2008 2017 35,364 37,117 -1,752
2018 2027 35,367 37,946 -2,578
2028 2037 35,376 38,229 -2,853
2038 2047 35,381 38,332 -2,951
2048 2057 35,381 38,289 -2,908
Birth Year of Birth Year of Health-Care Taxes Paid Net Balance
Oldest in Cohort Youngest in Cohort Spending for Health Care ($)
($) ($)
In Figure 2, we show how the burden of the taxes paid for health care is distributed over the
lifetime of an individual in each cohort. It shows that under the pay-as-you-go finance model,
the annual taxes required to pay for promised health-care spending will rise for each successive
birth cohort and that the peak taxes paid by each cohort will almost double between the oldest
baby boomers and those Canadians born after 1988. What this suggests is that rising health-
care spending due to aging baby boomers, combined with the fall in the proportion of working-
age Canadians, will mean that the main surge in taxes required to balance the health-care
budget can be expected over the next 20 years. Notice that the growth in the taxes required by
age profile for Canadians born between 1988 and 2048 is relatively small as the age/tax
profiles are tightly clustered for these younger and future birth cohorts. Most of the surge in
taxes falls on cohorts born after 1988. 
FIGURE 2:  ANNUAL TAXES REQUIRED BY AGE FOR 10-YEAR BIRTH COHORTS TO BALANCE ANNUAL HEALTH-CARE 
BUDGET (2008 $)
Table 1 demonstrates that pay-as-you-go financing, combined with population aging, leads to
substantial fiscal redistribution across generations. If nothing changes, birth “gifts” granted to
the baby-boom generation will be financed by birth “taxes” on their grandchildren. Table 1 also
shows that the largest beneficiaries of this system have been Canadians born between 1958 and
1977. In our model, Canadians in these birth cohorts benefit because they are part of a large
generation that followed a smaller generation; they benefited from being part of a large cohort
of workers sharing the relatively smaller burden of paying for fewer Canadians over 65 from
previous generations. These cohorts also benefited from the same technical and technological
change in health care that led to increased health-care spending up until 2008.19 The earliest
birth cohort we consider, those born between 1948 and 1957, has a relatively small positive
balance compared to later baby-boom birth cohorts. This reflects the fact that their low lifetime
tax payments for health care were accompanied by lower health spending by age due to the
more limited scope of medical treatment, and lower prices of health services, that they
experienced. The later cohorts in our simulation receive no gain from additional health-care
spending, since we assume fixed spending rates, but they face higher lifetime tax payments
because of their smaller numbers relative to the size of the aging baby-boom generation they
will have to support.
19 The deficits of the federal and provincial governments in the 1980s and 1990s also suggest that the baby boomers
were not paying even the full amount of these relatively low tax requirements, although they may have eventually
paid them as deficits and debts were eliminated.
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One response to the health-care balances that we have calculated is: “So what?” Productivity
growth, and increased incomes, while not changing our calculations, would relieve the relative
intergenerational burdens, as the higher lifetime taxes we project would represent a smaller
share of lifetime income for future, potentially higher-earning generations.20 In addition,
younger Canadians and future Canadians may benefit from bequests of wealth from deceased
baby-boomer parents and grandparents. Consequently, the higher incomes and wealth of
Canadians in the future makes the rising taxes for health care nothing more that a form of
progressive taxation across generations.21
While productivity growth can keep the relative tax burden from rising for future generations,
voters today cannot obligate voters in future to pay the taxes required to sustain current health
spending levels. Can we be certain that future taxpayers will agree to pay higher tax levels over
reducing promised health-care spending? In the case of the Canada Pension Plan reforms in the
late 1990s, arguments in favour of ignoring generational equity and maintaining pure pay-as-
you-go financing were not considered compelling, and it would be necessary to determine if
Canadians find the arguments any more compelling in the context of health care.
We believe that while the dismissive response to our calculations could be defended if
population aging was the only driver of rising health-care spending, our calculations in Table 1
have ignored the other two per cent per year or more that health-care spending is increasing for
reasons other than population aging. Table 2 shows the implications of 2.5 per cent annual
growth in per-capita expenditures on health, which is much lower than that observed annual
rates of growth of government expenditures on health care over the past decade.22 Where
population aging alone resulted in what appear to be modest birth gifts and birth taxes through
health-care finance in Canada, Table 2 shows the extremely troubling sizes of intergenerational
redistribution based on current health-care spending growth rates. As Table 2 shows, the rising
“price” of medicare for future generations may be enormous because the compounding rate of
increase in health-care spending gives a pay-as-you-go financing arrangement a “Ponzi
scheme” quality.
It is not clear that this rate of increase can be sustained indefinitely. It is hard to believe that
future taxpayers will agree to pay the high taxes required to pay for health-care promises,
particularly given the large intergenerational transfers associated with pay-as-you-go financed
health care in Canada. Can we count on productivity growth to average three per cent per year
or more so that incomes keep up with health spending?23
20 Consider that the near doubling of tax payments shown in Figure 2 represents taxes to be paid in 20 to 30 years time.
If real incomes rise by one per cent per year, roughly the same magnitude of increase in health-care spending due to
population aging, then incomes will also double over the same period, leaving unchanged the relative share of
income paid for health care.
21 This perspective was discussed in the late 1990s when population aging was raised as a reason for reforming the
Canada Pension Plan. The federal government, and presumably voters, did not find this perspective compelling as it
was considered to have been a logic that had resulted in the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s (Emery 1996).
22 See Di Matteo and Di Matteo (2009) for a discussion of these growth rates and forecasts of future growth rates.
23 Lee (2007, 15) shows that to maintain health spending as a constant share of GDP, Canada will need to have
sustained annual real growth rates of three per cent or more.
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TABLE 2:  HEALTH SPENDING GROWS 2.5 PER CENT PER ANNUM
IV. IS “PRE-FUNDING” A SOLUTION?
Policy analysts since at least the late 1990s proposed solving the financial challenges to
Canada’s single payer health-care systems both by eliminating the pure “pay-as-you-go”
structure of financing health-care spending and by accounting for the estimated future health-
care spending liabilities. In the 1990s, concerns over the sustainability of the Canada Pension
Plan, in the face of an aging population, resulted in the government of Canada moving away
from pay-as-you-go financing and introducing “pre-funding” of future pension benefits. Payroll
taxes were increased from 5.6 per cent of insurable earnings to a “steady state” tax rate of 9.9
per cent. The excess of tax revenues over current pension benefit expenditures were saved and
invested in the CPP Reserve fund. The success of the Canada Pension Plan finance reforms,
particularly for addressing issues of intergenerational equity, resulted in calls from policy
analysts, such as Bill Robson24, for provincial governments to take a similar approach to
reforming health-care finance.25 Pre-funding future health-care costs of aging baby boomers
through higher taxes in the near term would seem to have political feasibility. Polls of
Canadians and Albertans support both health-care premiums and higher taxes to maintain
health spending26 and it was possible to convince Canadians to accept higher taxes to pre-fund
the Canada Pension Plan. Nevertheless, introducing new taxes to fund spending is not always
politically popular. Voters worry that governments might not be trusted to carefully save and
prudently invest funds collected for future spending obligations.27
24 Robson, “Will the Baby Boomers Bust the Health Budget?”
25 See Oreopoulos (1998, 1999) and Oreopoulos and Vaillancourt (1998) for generational account estimates for public
pensions in Canada and the alternative financial reforms to address population aging.  Pre-funding future health-care
spending is discussed in Robson (2001) and Hogan and Hogan (2004).
26 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/story/2009/10/07/edmonton-cbc-poll-health-premiums-alberta.html. See
also Gerard Boychuk, “The Regulation of Private Health Funding and Insurance in Alberta Under the Canada Health
Act:  A Comparative Cross-Provincial Perspective.”  University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy SPS
Research Papers, The Health Series, (2008) Vol. 1 (1), 25-26.
27 This is why it was important for the reserve funds accumulated for the Canada Pension Plan to be managed at “arm’s
length” from the federal government.
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1948 1957 21,397 24,521 3,123
1958 1967 25,880 32,525 6,645
1968 1977 34,765 39,997 5,232
1978 1987 48,877 47,521 -1,356
1988 1997 68,404 58,986 -9,418
1998 2007 93,749 75,449 -18,300
2008 2017 124,826 96,854 -27,971
2018 2027 162,299 123,992 -38,307
2028 2037 208,794 158,739 -50,054
2038 2047 267,691 203,212 -64,478
2048 2057 342,375 260,126 -82,249
Birth Year of Birth Year of Health-Care Taxes Paid Net Balance
Oldest in Cohort Youngest in Cohort Spending for Health Care ($)
($) ($)
Net Present Value at Birth
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How much more tax would we need to collect from Canadians to fully pre-fund the implicit
health-care liabilities, ensuring a sufficient level of taxes collected to recoup their “birth gifts”
in Table 1? In this exercise, the additional taxes collected would leave all birth cohorts paying
the full cost of their own lifetime health spending, with the result that there are no
intergenerational transfers arising from population aging. Suppose we consider an unlikely tax
structure where taxes are set according to one’s year of birth and levied on all persons, and not
just on working individuals (e.g. a poll tax, differentiated by age). While such a tax could be
implemented, it would likely be a tough sell politically given the large differences in annual
taxes currently collected from across the different age groups of Canadians. Ironically,
Canadians seem to have no issues with the analogous inequity across age groups with respect
to the size of the implicit liabilities for health spending. 
We calculate the annual health tax as similar to a payment into a sinking fund that would retire
a liability over the life of a loan. The formula is the same annuity calculation used to determine
a mortgage payment for a fixed term at a stated rate of interest. It can also be thought of as the
amount an investor would need to invest in the current year in exchange for an equal annual
sum over a specified horizon, given a designated rate of re-investment. In our case, the sum in
the current year, similar to the amount of a mortgage, is the implicit at-birth liability, and the
annual tax is the annuity that would retire that liability. 
The algebraic formula is , 
where L is the unfunded liability, A is the annual tax payment, i is the interest rate, and
t is the “term” of the payments. The implicit liability is the value today of investing the excess
benefit at birth: L = bc (1 + i)t, where in this case t represents the cohort age, and bc represents
at-birth benefit to cohort c. We show the application of the equations below in Table 3.
The challenge for pre-funding implicit health-care liabilities is readily apparent in the last
column of Table 3. If we consider the aggregate implicit liabilities in public health care for
Canadians aged 24 to 65 in 2012, then we need to collect sufficient taxes over the next 20 or
30 years, invested at a five per cent rate of interest, to cover $469,056 million — that is, just
over $469 billion — which is roughly equal to the total net debt today of all provincial and
territorial governments.28 In other words, pre-funding the implicit liabilities of pay-as-you-go
health-care spending in Canada would effectively double the recognized indebtedness of
provincial and territorial governments.    
28 Source for provincial/territorial net debt is Fiscal Reference Tables, Department of Finance, Ottawa, October 2011.
This calculated implicit liability differs from that that calculated by Robson (2001, 2007) as we are not considering
the tax payments of Canadians under age 24 or unborn, and we are considering the health care balances from the
birth of all Canadians, and not just the liabilities dating from 2012.
L = A 1–(1+i)-t
i
TABLE 3: HEALTH-CARE BALANCES FOR SINGLE YEAR BIRTH COHORTS, CANADIANS AGED 24 TO 64 AT BIRTH AND AT 
CURRENT AGE IN 2012 (R=5 PER CENT, 2008 PURCHASING POWER)
NOTES: 10-year cohort balances at birth from Table 1. Present value (2008 purchasing power) at current age is the balance 
at birth compounded at five per cent annual interest from birth to current age in 2012. Population numbers from 
CANSIM II.
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24 232 713 473,262 337
25 1,558 5,025 481,282 2,418
26 1,558 5,276 487,191 2,570
27 1,558 5,540 485,481 2,689
28 1,558 5,817 483,096 2,810
29 1,558 6,108 482,230 2,945
30 1,558 6,413 484,083 3,104
31 1,558 6,734 477,535 3,216
32 1,558 7,070 466,713 3,300
33 1,558 7,424 459,560 3,412
34 1,558 7,795 460,195 3,587
35 4,060 21,329 460,585 9,824
36 4,060 22,395 461,025 10,325
37 4,060 23,515 451,659 10,621
38 4,060 24,691 454,825 11,230
39 4,060 25,925 462,302 11,985
40 4,060 27,221 479,646 13,057
41 4,060 28,582 481,048 13,749
42 4,060 30,011 477,218 14,322
43 4,060 31,512 475,634 14,988
44 4,060 33,088 483,180 15,987
45 4,147 35,487 510,752 18,125
46 4,147 37,261 548,836 20,450
47 4,147 39,124 566,918 22,180
48 4,147 41,080 570,328 23,429
49 4,147 43,134 553,851 23,890
50 4,147 45,291 553,991 25,091
51 4,147 47,555 543,987 25,869
52 4,147 49,933 530,543 26,492
53 4,147 52,430 524,665 27,508
54 4,147 55,051 514,983 28,350
55 935 13,033 499,138 6,505
56 935 13,684 494,168 6,762
57 935 14,369 475,160 6,827
58 935 15,087 452,641 6,829
59 935 15,841 433,084 6,861
60 935 16,633 423,922 7,051
61 935 17,465 413,281 7,218
62 935 18,338 402,858 7,388
63 935 19,255 399,945 7,701
64 935 20,218 398,284 8,052
Age in Present value Present value Population Balance for
2012 of balance at birth of balance (both sexes) population of given
($) at age in 2012 2011 age in 2012
($) (millions $)
Where the sizes of the balances at birth seem “manageable,” the problem with the baby-boom
generation is that these balances have been compounding in value for 40 years or more. For
example, the youngest of the baby-boom generation, which turned 45 in 2012, had a net
present value of their implicit liability in health care of $4,147 at birth. But after 45 years at a
five per cent interest rate, the value of that balance today is $35,487.29 Beginning now to retire
this liability would require a sizeable annual tax. If we were to collect a tax from this person
for 20 years until they reach age 65, we would need to collect almost $2,85030 more per year
over and above what is currently collected in annual taxes from that person. Those additional
taxes would then have to be invested to earn a five per cent real annual rate of return in order
to retire the unfunded liability. For younger working Canadians in 2012, the individualized tax
to retire the unfunded liability is not as onerous. For someone 30 years old in 2012, with 35
years remaining to pay before retirement, the additional annualized health tax collected would
be about $390 per year. For Canadians closer to retirement, such as a 54-year-old, with only a
decade of tax collection years left before retirement and a $55,000 unfunded health-care
liability in 2012, the tax to retire the liability would be over $6,600 per year, for a decade.
Would Canadians currently in the workforce accept paying these taxes for health-care services
they will receive in 20 to 30 years time, rather than on services, or consumption, today?
An alternative approach would be to tax Canadians for 20 years at an amount that would be
sufficient to cover the average unfunded liability of Canadians aged 24 to 65. The government
would need to collect $1,900 from each person for 20 years to cover the per-capita value of the
implicit liability of $23,763 in 2012. These revenues would then need to be invested at a five
per cent real rate of return to completely retire the implicit liability. Further, collecting a tax for
20 years only from Canadians aged 24 to 65 would require taxing Canadians who, in 2012, are
under age 24, as they age, to replace the tax payments that cease to be collected from
Canadians who move past age 65 during that 20-year period. This would be a large amount of
tax to collect for future health-care services and it does not solve the intergenerational
imbalance in a satisfying way. Focusing the tax collection on Canadians in the tax-paying ages
for the next 20 years would cover the aggregate unfunded liability largely by moving the
burden from our grandchildren to our children. The generation owing the most for health-care
is still spared the burden of payment as they move beyond age 65.
Some will lament that pre-funding should have started a decade ago or more, when we
implemented pre-funding for the Canada Pension Plan. Clearly this longer time horizon to
collect taxes would have reduced the annual amount of tax that needed to be collected.
However, it still would have entailed substantial tax levels. From the example above, a
45-year-old in 2012 would have to pay $2,850 per year until age 65 to retire his or her implicit
health-care liability. If we had started collecting in 2002 when this person was 35, there would
be both a lower implicit liability ($21,329 vs. $35,487) and longer time horizon to collect
(30 vs. 20 years). The annual tax required to retire the implicit liability would have been
$1,400, roughly half of the taxes required per year in a scenario where pre-funding starts
10 years later, at age 45.
29 L = bc (1 + i)t + 4147(1+ 0.05)45 = 37,261. For current (2008) dollars, 37,261 x 0.9524 = 35,487
30 Algebraically, we solve for A in the equation: L = A 1–(1 + i)–t , 35,487 = A 1–(1 + 0.05)–20 = A x 12.4622 →
A = 2847.59.
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Some will argue that full pre-funding is not realistic, but at least partial pre-funding would be
appropriate. Clearly, partial pre-funding reduces the political tensions arising from pay-as-you-
go, but it does not eliminate the problem. Pre-funding may look like an effective tactic if the
only source of increasing health-care expenditures is an aging population. But if health-care
expenditures grow at 2.5 per cent per year due to drivers beyond the effects of population
aging, pre-funding to any degree will look like a costly yet ineffective tax policy given the
sizes of the generational balances in Table 2. 
An important difference between health-care spending and government spending on public
pension benefits, as in the Canada Pension Plan, is that governments have greater control over
benefit levels and total spending for public pensions than they do for health care. With health
care, technical and technological progress in medical treatment, inflation of input prices for the
sector and a myriad of other cost drivers have resulted in sustained, high spending growth for
health care. Thus while health-care spending increases that are expected strictly from
population aging can be predictable, the amount of pre-funding still necessary to address the
intergenerational transfers under pay-as-you-go funding, and overall health spending growth, is
harder to determine, and as Table 2 shows, is likely very large. At a minimum, any pre-funding
tax policy should be accompanied by government efforts to contain the size of annual
expenditure increases.
V. WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE?  
Population Policies
Pro-natalist policies to encourage more births offer one avenue for reducing the tax burden. As
Figure 3 shows, if Canadian fertility rates returned to an average rate of two births per woman,
the negative health-care balances for Canadians born after 1998 would be reduced and would
be positive for Canadians born between 2028 and 2048.  
How likely is that we would see Canadian fertility at this level? Beaujot’s31 discussion of
population projections for Canada highlights that a fertility rate of two would be a large change
to expect, as even high fertility rate projections have peaked around 1.8 children per woman.
Beaujot32 and Gauthier33 both suggest that policy levers for influencing fertility may prove
impotent for the task. Gauthier34 finds that policies directly targeted at families with children
— such as direct and indirect cash transfers for families with children; means-tested child-
welfare benefits; maternity and parental leave benefits; and childcare facilities and related
subsidy programs — lead to, at most, small increases in fertility. Beaujot35 highlights that more
effective policies are found in the realm of social policy, rather than tax and transfer policies 
31 Roderic Beaujot, “Projecting the Future of Canada’s Population:  Assumptions, Implications and Policy.” Canadian
Studies in Population 30(1), 1-28. (2003)
32 Ibid., 20
33 Anne H. Gauthier,“The Impact of Family Policies on Fertility in Industrialized Countries: A Review of the
Literature.” Population Research and Policy Review 26(3), (2007), 323–346.
34 Ibid.
35 Beaujot, “Projecting the Future of Canada’s Population,” 20.
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targeted to children, where fertility can be encouraged through: greater support for families,
regardless of their type; reduced gender dependencies in families; and a more equitable
distribution of earning and caring activities between men and women. Finally, growing the
population size with higher birth rates comes with other costs that would need to be balanced
against the health-care tax relief it might bring future Canadians.
FIGURE 3: NET PRESENT VALUE AT BIRTH OF LIFETIME HEALTH SPENDING LESS LIFETIME TAXES PAID FOR 
HEALTH CARE, 10-YEAR BIRTH COHORTS, FERTILITY FIXED AT 2008 RATES AND HIGH FERTILITY AFTER 2008
Higher immigration levels could also help offset the extent of population aging in Canada, but
the benefit would depend on a sufficiently young age distribution of immigrants, and, if
fertility remains at its existing levels, significantly higher numbers of immigrants. Beaujot36
and Denton et al.37 argue that immigration cannot be expected to “correct” the age structure
and slow population aging in Canada.  
Do what should be done regardless of population aging: Reform health service delivery
Evans et al.38 assess that the “Apocalyptic Demography” type of calculations and projections
that we present, based on no changes in age-specific use rates for health care, are “somewhat
illogical,” if not “intellectually dead,” because we have not historically seen age-specific
health-care use remain constant. Evans et al. highlight that evidence from British Columbia
shows that (in the past) one would have made very poor forecasts of hospital usage if, as we
have, one was to assume only changing demographics, yet constant rates of health-care use. 
36 Beaujot, “Projecting the Future of Canada’s Population,” 20.
37 Frank T. Denton, Christine H. Feaver and Byron G. Spencer, “Alternative Pasts, Possible Futures:  A ‘What If’ Study
of the Effects of Fertility on the Canadian Population and Labour Force.” Canadian Public Policy – Analyse de
politiques XXVIII(3) (2002), 456.
38 Evans et al, “Apocalypse No.”
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While our projections of lifetime health-care spending and tax balances are useful for showing
what will happen if we are at “the end of history,” and health-care utilization rates do not
change, it is interesting to investigate whether changes in utilization rates by age, as proxied by
reductions in health-care spending by age, could be expected to address the generational
imbalances of health care.
Governments in Canada have been looking at how to reform the delivery of care to reduce
health-care costs for some time, but it has been slow to happen. Their interest in this direction
for health-care reform has not been driven by concerns over population aging as much as it has
been by maintaining their fiscal positions. But it is possible that, if governments can deliver on
these reforms, some of the generational imbalances that currently exist through medicare
would be addressed. Promising avenues for reducing health-care spending include:
encouraging home care for the elderly and for palliative care; reducing the prevalence and
severity of chronic disease in the population; changing how chronic diseases are managed so as
to reduce reliance on doctors and hospitals for treatment purposes.  
We argue that policymakers should consider ways to maintain the level of services provided,
but lower the price of doing so. As an example, consider the use of acute-care hospital beds
and doctors and specialists. The most expensive inputs in the health-care system are the acute-
care hospitals and physicians. It has long been identified that these care providers and that care
setting are not necessary, nor ideal, for caring for the elderly. Consequently, policy efforts that
shift care settings to the home, particularly in palliative care situations, and that shift service
provision to non-physician providers, may offer considerable potential for reducing the levels
of spending for meeting the medical and health needs of the older population. Because this
reduction in “price” of providing services, which may prove effective in reducing health
expenditures without reducing services provided, would target the birth cohorts (such as the
baby boomers) that have “underpaid” for their lifetime health care, such a policy direction
would seem ideal for addressing intergenerational equity issues in Canadian medicare.
The potential reductions in spending from health promotion and reforming the delivery of
health services for chronic conditions and the elderly are large. Health-care spending,
particularly for the elderly and persons with chronic conditions, who account for the majority
of health-care spending each year in Canada, seems to be needlessly high. As we noted earlier
(page 6), while seniors accounted for 14 per cent of the total population, they accounted for 44
per cent of total health-care expenditures by provincial and territorial governments. The same
report from CIHI39 shows that the majority of these per-person costs are for services provided
by a physician and/or in an acute-care hospital, and that the majority of provincial and
territorial government expenditures on hospitals are for hospital services provided to Canadians
over age 65. In many cases, these elderly patients occupying acute-care beds and under
treatment by physicians, do not require such an intensive level of care and could be treated in
the home with nursing care, complemented by less intensive physician care. In addition, Lee40
summarizes that the literature finds that one-third to one-half of these costs of seniors are “end
of life costs”: health-care costs in what, ex post, is identified as the “last year of life.” Lee
reports the contrast in costs when persons of a given age who were in their last year of life are
separated from persons who were not in their last year of life. For persons age 65 not in their  
39 Canadian Institute for Health Information, National Health Expenditure Trends, 1975 to 2011, 44-46.
40 Marc Lee, “How Sustainable is Medicare? A Closer Look at Aging, Technology and Other Cost Drivers in Canada’s
Health Care System.” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (2007), 11.
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final year of life, annual health costs were around $600 per person; for those persons age 65 in
their last year of life, costs were $30,000 per person. As much as half of this end-of-life per-
patient cost could be avoided by shifting palliative care patients out of hospital care and into
home care.41 Finlayson et al.’s study42 identified that the treatment of persons with chronic
conditions accounts for 40 per cent to 60 per cent of health-care expenditures, which are
largely through the publicly funded acute-care medical system (a.k.a. “medicare”), and
suggested that as much as 40 per cent of these costs were avoidable through improved
nutrition, affordable housing, reduced smoking and regular exercise. We note that all of these
inputs to health can be influenced by public policy.
To illustrate the potential that health promotion and health-service reform offers for restoring
generational balance in health-care finance, we investigate an “upper bound” calculation for
health-care spending reductions associated with lowering the prevalence of chronic conditions
in the Canadian population. In other words, we reduce health spending by each year of age by
16 per cent to reflect Finlayson et al.’s43 estimate that 40 per cent of all medical treatment is
accounted for by treatment of persons with chronic conditions and that 40 per cent of such
costs are considered to be “avoidable” through prevention and effective management of
chronic disease. Next, we calculate the net present value of lifetime health spending reductions
from ages 45, 55 and 65 to age 85 associated with this change in utilization rates. We then
calculate the annuitized value of that lump sum to produce an annual sum that can be
compared to the annual taxes calculated earlier under the pre-funding investigation.   
For a 45-year-old who changes his or her behaviour and health so as to avoid chronic disease
health problems, the net present value of the reduction in remaining lifetime health spending at
age 45 is roughly $16,000. Over his or her 40 years of remaining life, the annuity value of the
health improvement’s impact on acute-care health spending is $935 per year. Compared to the
pre-funding tax calculated above, achieving the maximum potential avoidance of chronic
disease eliminates almost half of the implicit liability of health spending for a 45-year-old.  
The situation changes for older individuals because the higher levels of health spending on
acute-care occur in the nearer term. Consequently, where it was unlikely that sufficient taxes
for pre-funding purposes could be collected from persons already closer to age 65, the annuity
value of the potential health-care spending reductions for a 55-year-old is $8,114 per year and,
for a 65-year-old, $11,826 per year, which is more than sufficient to fully address the implicit
liability in health care. Indeed, it appears that size of spending reductions would be sufficient
to also cover the shortfall for the 45-year-old.
While we have motivated these calculations based on reducing chronic disease prevalence, the
scenario just presented really requires a 16 per cent reduction in health spending by age,
particularly for ages 65 and higher. This could be achieved by a combination of: reduced
chronic disease prevalence; shifting senior care from acute-care hospitals to the home; shifting
care from physician-focused to multidisciplinary teams; and by shifting the site of palliative
care. It would seem that the margins for achieving health spending reductions are sufficiently
large that the scenario just presented could occur and in the relatively near term.    
41 Browne, Birch, Thebane and team (2012, viii) report that, in 2006, the per-patient cost for palliative care in an acute-
care bed was $19,900, compared to $4,700 for home care.   
42 Greg Finlayson et al, The Additional Cost, of Chronic Disease in Manitoba (Winnipeg, MB: Manitoba Centre for
Health Policy, April 2010).
43 Ibid.
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a model of Canada’s single-payer, “pay-as-you-go”-financed health-care
system that makes evident the serious problem with the intergenerational inequities that exist
under the status quo of health-care funding. It is clear that if access to health care is to remain
universal and levels of quality are to be maintained at the level they are today, then taxes will
have to be raised dramatically in the future to support the aging population. The question then
becomes: Who pays for it? If things remain as they are, such obligations will be inordinately
borne by future generations. We have considered a few possible policy directions for
addressing this fiscal challenge for Canadian medicare, such as: doing nothing; pre-funding
future health spending through higher taxes today; population policies aimed at offsetting the
impact of the aging baby boomers on health spending; and altering the age-spending profile so
as to provide the promised levels of health services, but at lower costs.  
Only the last option offers any realistic chance of restoring generational balance to pay-as-you-
go health care in Canada. Governments have many reasons other than generational equity for
reforming health-service delivery and promoting healthier lifestyles to reduce chronic disease
burdens. Indeed, the real question is: Why haven’t governments pushed harder for these
reforms and changes given that they have been proposed on many occasions in past?
Generational equity considerations highlight another dividend of health-care reform beyond the
direct fiscal impact for government budgets and well-being of the population.  
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